Thursday, July 03, 2003
Everyone seems to think that John Stuart Mill defends a classical liberal, Lockean idea of liberty as freedom from coercion, especially governmental coercion. I think this misses Mill's point in *On Liberty*: for Mill, liberty requires freedom from the much broader idea of “the moral coercion of public opinion.”
Mill’s so-called “harm principle,” which is at the root of his defense of liberty, is often common-sensically interpreted according to what I term the political interpretation of the harm principle. On the political interpretation the harm principle is intended to restrict the use of coercion, especially governmental coercion. On the political interpretation the harm principle is intended to draw a line between those areas of life that are subject to moral sanctions, and those that are subject to the law. All the mechanisms of moral suasion, including even boycotting, excommunication and shunning, are available to the moral realm; but when one’s actions harm another, they become subject to legal punishment.
I think Mill really has in mind a different principle, which I call the social interpretation of the harm principle. According to the social interpretation, the harm principle is intended to restrict expressions of disapproval, such as boycotting or blacklisting. According to the social interpretation, the harm principle rules out any such notion as private morality/immorality: for something to be considered immoral, it must harm others.
The implications of this theory in practice are radically different from the implications of the political interpretation. Rather than the kind of laissez-faire attitude that Libertarians like to draw from Mill, I think Mill's actually theory implies significant interventionist policies -- such as regulation of hiring/firing decisions, governmental funding for arts and ideas, and (more arguably) regulation of "hate speech."
Mill’s so-called “harm principle,” which is at the root of his defense of liberty, is often common-sensically interpreted according to what I term the political interpretation of the harm principle. On the political interpretation the harm principle is intended to restrict the use of coercion, especially governmental coercion. On the political interpretation the harm principle is intended to draw a line between those areas of life that are subject to moral sanctions, and those that are subject to the law. All the mechanisms of moral suasion, including even boycotting, excommunication and shunning, are available to the moral realm; but when one’s actions harm another, they become subject to legal punishment.
I think Mill really has in mind a different principle, which I call the social interpretation of the harm principle. According to the social interpretation, the harm principle is intended to restrict expressions of disapproval, such as boycotting or blacklisting. According to the social interpretation, the harm principle rules out any such notion as private morality/immorality: for something to be considered immoral, it must harm others.
The implications of this theory in practice are radically different from the implications of the political interpretation. Rather than the kind of laissez-faire attitude that Libertarians like to draw from Mill, I think Mill's actually theory implies significant interventionist policies -- such as regulation of hiring/firing decisions, governmental funding for arts and ideas, and (more arguably) regulation of "hate speech."
